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Innovation Lock-in: Unlocking Research and Development Path Dependency in 
the Australian Wine Industry 
Abstract 
Innovation within the Australian wine industry is at a crossroads. More specifically, 
under the influence of fundamental paradigm shifts, the objectives, extension and 
uptake of R&D within the industry’s current innovation framework are being 
subjected to rather schizophrenic forces. At one level, industry organizations are 
directing the R&D agenda from within a national, ‘Brand Australia’ context. At 
another level, the firms that are being serviced by these organizations are demanding 
region-specific R&D extension in response to global pressure for differentiation and 
products at higher price-points. This paper will explore these contradictory forces and 
the degree to which they signal an emergence of innovation lock-in within the 
industry. It will also propose a model for the effective distribution of R&D at a 
regional or local level. 
 
Introduction 
Between the early 1980s and the new millennium, the Australian wine industry had 
transformed itself from a domestic-oriented, cottage-style industry into a leading 
producer, exporter and innovator of table wine. The centralization of resources and 
funding, together with a nationally focused R&D program, was a model that worked 
exceptionally well in this transformation. It united a fragmented industry with 
disparate objectives and markets to create a growth organization focused on a single 
operating paradigm – that of ‘Brand Australia’ (GWRDC, 2004). The foundation of 
‘Brand Australia’ was a blended wine product targeted at the ‘popular-premium’ 
segment of the market. It was technically faultless, fruit-driven, and provided value 
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for money. The industry’s national R&D program delivered this product consistently 
to a market in which it was rapidly gaining share and within two decades Australian 
wine dominated the popular-premium price points in both the UK and US markets 
(MacQuitty, 2006). 
 
Over the last six to seven years, however, a very different wine landscape has been 
emerging. A dramatic escalation in merger and acquisition activity within the global 
industry is creating a new operating paradigm. Compounding industry rationalisation 
at the domestic level, international mergers and alliances have undermined traditional 
boundaries, rendering national strategies less than effective (Aylward, 2005). Once 
national icons in both New and Old World sectors may now be subsidiaries of 
international conglomerates. Examples of this include California’s Beringer Wines 
being swallowed by Australia’s Fosters Group, and France’s Pernod Ricard 
consuming Australia’s Wyndham Estate as well as Britain’s Allied Domecq and New 
Zealand’s Montana Estate. On an even larger scale there is the US giant Constellation 
Wines which has absorbed Australia’s BRL Hardy, Canada’s Vincorp, California’s 
Mondavi, and 40% of Italy’s Ruffino Wines while establishing a distribution alliance 
with France’s famous Rothschilds (Sands, 2006). 
 
The scale of this rationalisation has largely been in response to the ‘commodification’ 
of wine. Economies of scale, streamlined distribution, multiple production sites and 
geographically diversified vineyards and markets are all ingredients in what has 
become a global ‘wine lake’. A firm such as Constellation, for example, can source 
grapes and wine from its Canadian subsidiary to service bulk and popular-premium 
price points, from its Australian subsidiary to service popular-premium and super-
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premium price points and from its Californian subsidiary to service the super-
premium and icon price points. Similarly, it may use its Italian and French 
connections to service primarily European markets while it orients its Australian, 
Canadian and Californian subsidiaries to service New World markets, or in fact, 
cross-subsidize deficiencies in one market with surpluses from another (Sands, 2006). 
Such flexibility is critical to a firm of its size, and, of course, ensures competitive 
advantage.  
 
What this flexibility also demonstrates, however, is the extent to which the Australian 
and other national wine industries have become subordinate to global forces.  Once 
simple operating paradigms structured along national agendas and priorities are now 
subject to a myriad of competing and often conflicting pressures. These pressures also 
require rapid, flexible and differentiated responses, particularly in the arenas of R&D 
extension, branding and distribution.  
 
The Global-Local nexus 
Paradoxically, the continuing globalization of the wine industry has, in turn, created 
nexi of local and regional linkages. While national agendas face at least partial 
‘decommissioning’, local and regional wine clusters have been rediscovered as 
providers of the differentiation now being demanded (Taplin, 2006).  Increasingly 
educated consumers are graduating through a series of rising price points and 
demanding heritage and a product story. They are also demanding a noticeable 
departure from the blended, somewhat nomadic wine styles that flood the popular-
premium price points (Wittwer, 2006). The net result is a product that provides a clear 
point-of-difference, but there is far more to the story (Sanders, 2005). Local and 
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regional differentiation begins with region-specific R&D, branding, infrastructure, 
marketing and distribution.  
 
Regional wine clusters within the Australian industry should be ideally placed to 
navigate the global wine landscape. In a number of cases they have developed strong 
brand images through the pursuit of wine quality and consumer-driven styles. Firms 
within these clusters are attempting to target niche markets in both on-and off-licence 
segments. Through a critical mass of regulatory bodies, suppliers, growers, funding 
agencies and the wine firms themselves, the most developed regional clusters are 
securing a high level of infrastructure and integration. In addition, the ability to secure 
flexible distribution channels has long been a success story within New World wine 
clusters (Aylward, 2004, 2006a).  
 
Emerging innovation lock-in 
Ironically, however, it is Australia’s historical success in R&D that is now hampering 
the drive for differentiation. This paper will argue that the industry’s previous success 
in delivering a national R&D agenda has created a path dependency from which 
stakeholders are now finding it difficult to deviate (Aylward, 2006a). Moving from a 
centralised operating paradigm to one of multiple levels and nodes has proved 
difficult for such a culturally homogenised industry. Furthermore, forms of innovation 
lock-in and inertia are now emerging as a response to discordant priorities between 
regional wine firms and the industry organisations by which they are serviced 
(Aylward, forthcoming; Croser, 2006).  
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In line with their mandate, the national industry organisations continue to prioritise 
and fund R&D extension along national pathways. In terms of oenological advances, 
viticulture management, quality standards, branding and product development, the 
agenda is most often set using generic national benchmarks and based to a large 
degree upon the requirements of Australia’s major wine firms (Interviews, 2005). 
Even the recently established regional extension programs draw inevitably on the 
expertise of central bodies and personnel due to their centralised control (Grape and 
Wine Research and Development Corporation, 2005). While regional associations are 
in existence and should logically manage these regional R&D priorities, their inability 
to access central resources means they also lack the personnel and expertise required 
to run these programs. In addition, very few regional representatives sit on the central 
decision-making committees.  
 
The ‘voice’ of regional petitions in many cases is simply not heard. When it is granted 
attention, the response is often an inappropriately generic one. The national ‘Brand 
Australia’ approach to internationalization of the wine industry remains focused on 
satisfying the need for product consistency and value within the popular-premium 
price points. The approach of wine firms to this same internationalization is 
increasingly one of single-vineyard, differentiated and regionally-branded products 
that satisfy growing demands within niche price points of the more developed 
markets. This ‘gap’ between what is requested and what is supplied will continue to 
widen. While ever the two main stakeholders – industry organisations and firms – 
perceive and respond to different pressures, their ‘gap’ in priorities will increasingly 
tend towards a unique form of innovation inertia. 
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Using empirical data from a recent industry-wide survey, the paper will highlight the 
discord in these imperatives and suggest that in the quest for greater regional identity, 
niche production and targeting of higher price-points, localized/regionalized R&D 
extension is a critical pre-requisite.  
 
The Australian wine industry’s current innovation landscape 
In 2006, the Australian wine industry has approximately 2000 participating firms, 
with 166,000 hectares under vine producing 1.4 billion litres of beverage wine. It is 
the world’s fourth largest exporter and dominates the popular-premium price points in 
the two largest wine markets - the UK and the USA - as well as representing 
approximately 8% of the global wine trade (Winetitles, 2006). 
 
Structurally, the industry is populated by a small number of large conglomerates and 
approximately 1,980 micro, small and medium-sized firms. These firms are 
concentrated in a number of regions within four of Australia’s states – New South 
Wales, Victoria, Western Australia and Victoria. The regions of South Australia make 
up what is often referred to as the industry’s dominant wine cluster (Aylward, 2005). 
Infrastructure and resource planning within the industry is highly centralised in 
comparison to other New and Old World wine industries. The Grape and Wine 
Research and Development Corporation (GWRDC) is at the centre of this structure as 
the industry’s intermediary body, that collects R&D levies and government funding, 
determines R&D priorities, resource allocation, and ultimately, industry vision. There 
is also the Australian Wine Research Institute (AWRI), which conducts the majority 
of the industry’s research; the Cooperative Research Centre for Viticulture (CRCV), 
which conducts viticultural research; the Australian Wine and Brandy Corporation 
7
(AWBC), which controls information, promotes and regulates the industry; and the 
Winemakers’ Federation of Australia (WFA), which sponsors strategic and 
promotional issues (Winemakers' Federation of Australia, 2006).  These, together 
with a number of other national organisations are located within the South Australian 
wine cluster (Winetitles, 2006).   
 
In terms of innovation, the industry’s centralisation was a key component in its 
transition from domestic to international status. Industry organisations such as the 
GWRDC, the AWBC and the WFA have been key players in the industry’s ‘2025 
vision’.  This original article of policy and operation, introduced in 1995, focused on 
growing Australia’s exports in quantity and quality through the national extension of 
R&D (Grape and Wine Research and Development Corporation, 2004). It was 
implemented in a period of embryonic internationalisation for the industry and has 
become a mandate for these organisations. As a result, vision and response to 
changing environments is determined by a mantle of national rather than regional 
priorities. As mentioned, these priorities are increasingly in discord with those of a 
growing number of firms whose mandates dictate differentiation within mature, 
discerning markets. 
Theoretical Framework 
Interpretations of Lock-in or Inertia 
There are many interpretations of lock-in/inertia. Of the more pronounced theories, is 
that offered by Hannan et al. (2004) who define inertia as “a persistent organizational 
resistance to changing architecture”. They argue that structural and architectural 
inertia have deterministic qualities; that they emerge through a Darwinian type of 
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natural selection; and that the longer the organization survives, the more static it 
becomes.  Maintaining an approximate status quo saves organisations from exposing 
themselves to abrupt variations or directional change and thereby reduces the risk of 
mortality (Hannan & Freeman, 1984). 
 
The derivative argument is that inertia maintains organisational linkages, internal 
dynamics, hierarchical and operational legitimacy, as well as structural arrangements 
that have evolved over time. If substantial internal or external pressure is applied to 
any one of these factors an uncertain path is created (Hannan et al., 2004; Ruef, 
2004).  Theorists such as Greenwood and Hinings (1996) contend that the institutional 
environment, with its cultural, social and business ‘norms’, applies an architectural 
‘straightjacket’ to the average organization. Breaking from such a straightjacket may 
expose the organisation to cultural isolation or ‘ex-communication’, which again 
increases the risk of mortality. A further degree of complexity is added by DiMaggio 
and Powell (1991) who contend that highly structured organisations provide a context 
within which efforts to deal with uncertainty in a rational manner invariably leads to 
greater uniformity. Rational decision making is a value created by the environment 
within which the organization operates and one that inevitably encourages 
homogeneity as the organizational environment evolves.  
 
Brown (2002) is less sympathetic to this theory. He argues that a lack of change is 
equally detrimental to an organization and that inertia can and does create significant 
liability. Conservative action in the face of change may protect the organization in the 
short-term, but by not implementing the change required to compete within new and 
changing environments it is exposed to often overpowering pressures. However, 
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Brown (2002) also contends that when an organisation makes a radical and successful 
change, others tend to follow and over time institutionalise that change. This not only 
creates clear pathways for future change, but also helps eliminate resistance to that 
change.  
 
The theory is reinforced by Genschel (1997), who states that: “The avoidance of 
disruptions in the near future may lock actors into developmental pathways which 
lead into dead ends, and thus cause disruptions in the distant future”. Further, 
organisations that favour lock-in or inertia at a time when their industry sector may be 
experiencing radical change create an environment of discordant operating paradigms.  
 
The Innovation Perspective of Inertia 
Embedded within the organizational framework is the innovation-based theory of 
inertia (Pierson, 2000). Due to what Anderson (2005) refers to as the co-evolution of 
technology, institutions and organizations, with institutions providing the ‘background 
conditioning’ for innovation, the emergence of inertia within this domain is almost 
pre-determined (Lundvall, 1988). When industry participants follow conservative 
organizational pathways in order to limit various forms of risk, their structural, 
behavioural and innovative frameworks tend to imitate this conservatism. Within the 
innovation domain, this is referred to as lock-in or path dependency. Firms, 
organizations and industry sectors can be prone to a condition whereby previous 
innovation success creates habitual pathways. The more historically successful the 
industry and the more pronounced its operational pathways, the more risk-averse its 
frameworks and the more likely the legacy of lock-in (Ditter, 2005).
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Innovation lock-in, while offering a veneer of protection to existing systems in the 
shorter term, tends to create barriers to more sustainable innovation (Foxon & 
Pearson, 2006). The argument by Pierson (2000) that institutions are ‘particularly 
prone to increasing returns’ reinforces the fatal attraction of this lock-in and the 
cultural corrugations that become established. Once a successful recipe has been 
found, no matter how dated that recipe eventually becomes, institutions are reluctant 
to experiment elsewhere. This bias is probably most applicable to process innovations 
such as R&D extension, wherein established routes, mechanisms, personnel, methods 
and models of extension that have supported innovative leaps in the past create 
habitual pathways. These pathways become entrenched within the institutional culture 
of the industry and create their own legitimacy through continued use and acceptance. 
Deviating from such pathways can be problematic. It can be expensive, the risks of 
failure are greater, and the returns are unpredictable (Hannan & Freeman, 1984). A 
simple analogy is the desire to remain on a well-trodden walking track rather than 
explore the virgin forest on either side. Cutting a new path through the forest may 
indeed lead to more interesting places, but the effort involved is considerable. 
Although the well-trodden path provides no new views or points of interest, it is easy 
and predictable. In this lies the veneer of protection and security.  
 
By not deviating, however, R&D pathways of extension in any evolving industry 
implicitly fail to service all but a homogenised clientele (Ditter, 2005). As such, 
differentiated users of R&D with differentiated requirements represent an increasingly 
dissatisfied customer base. As they react to disparate markets that demand unique 
products from niche production systems, the underlying R&D system fails to support 
their needs. The R&D imperatives of the service provider and those of its non-
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homogenised clientele become dislocated.   It is this dislocation or gap in industry 
imperatives that the paper refers to as inertia.
Aims of the Paper 
Using data from 165 firms within the Australian wine industry the paper will report 
on the perceived importance of regional R&D extension in the development of 
differentiated, locally-branded products. It will also report on perceptions of an 
emerging dislocation between wine organizations’ R&D imperatives and those of the 
firms they service. The paper’s hypothesis is that in the industry’s current climate of 
complex paradigmatic shifts from national systems to those reflecting global-local 
nexi of production, distribution and marketing, there has emerged an industry-level 
R&D inertia that transcends simple organizational or institutional domains. 
 
Deriving from this hypothesis is the argument that for long-term sustainability and 
reputation the Australian wine industry must organize its R&D extension to reflect the 
growing demand for higher price point, regionally branded products.  
 
Empirical Methodology 
The current study focuses on the industry’s R&D extension (innovation) and its 
potential barrier to regional, differentiated identity. The role and effectiveness of the 
industry organizations is, therefore, addressed in the study’s user survey, where firms 
are asked to comment on a range of industry R&D initiatives and their implications. 
The survey was conducted between June 2005 and February 2006, was perception-
based and exclusively used responses from 165 micro and SME firms. The study has 
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also drawn on findings of the author’s previous empirical studies to provide context 
and substantiation of findings (Aylward, 2004, 2005, 2006a). 
 
Wine firms, as the primary users of the industry’s R&D, provided the survey sample 
for this study. A randomised, size-stratified methodology was chosen for this 
sampling (Harrison et al., 1996). Care was taken to ensure a similar number of firms 
from each of the four chosen states – New South Wales, South Australia, Western 
Australia and Victoria – were captured. In addition, only exporting firms were 
included in the survey and again, care was taken to include equal representation from 
the diverse regions within each state. In each case, either the CEO or production 
manager was the respondent. Surveys were conducted by phone, so a high response 
rate of approximately 75% was achieved. In addition to the survey instrument, in-
depth interviews were carried out with a sub-set of firms whose initial survey 
responses provided valuable qualitative data that needed further investigation. 
Findings 
Establishing a context for the paper’s hypothesis, surveyed firms were initially asked 
about the generic importance of ‘regional identity’ to their firm’s marketing and 
operational success, as well as their product’s reputation in domestic and international 
markets. Overall, 91% (148) of firms believed that this identity was either critical or
very important to these activities. A number of those involved in the in-depth 
interview section of the study commented that regional or local identity is a notion 
with which New World industries are still coming to terms, but one that is culturally 
embedded within most European wine industries. Their view is that the development 
of regional infrastructure with localised planning, coordination, distribution and 
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marketing require an entirely new thinking process. Wine needs to be understood as a 
value-adding process that blends art and science in a unique and highly desirable way. 
The Europeans, they argue, understand this and practice it to their advantage, while 
most New World industries still view wine with an industrialist mentality as little 
more than a commodity. 
 
Reinforcing this view, only 33% of surveyed firms believed that industry 
organisations within the Australian wine sector placed importance on regional identity 
or differentiation. The perception was most apparent in the isolated regions of 
Western Australia, where a mere 23% of firms believed that industry organisations 
were servicing or even understanding their interests. 
 
Underlining the call for greater regional identity is the growing pressure to create a 
point-of-difference in product and marketing. Global distributors and consumers are 
becoming more sophisticated in their approach to wine and are looking beyond the 
Australian guarantee of consistency and value for money. There is pressure to 
produce and market wines with individual stories, heritage and a legitimate claim on 
terroir (Brook, 2000; Croser, 2004). In terms of sustainability it is also critical for the 
Australian industry to discard its reputation for bland ‘industrial’ wine by targeting 
higher price points with low-yield, high-quality products that are individually crafted.  
Of the surveyed firms, 87% claimed that such differentiation was integral to their 
sustained competitiveness. An equal number believed it was also integral to the 
industry’s sustainability. Further, they believed that it was inextricably linked to 
regional and local identity. Yet this ‘point-of-difference’ is currently antithetical to the 
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generic ‘Brand Australia’ approach being adhered to by the industry organisations 
with which, it is interesting to note, only 26% of firms are in agreement.  
 
Regional Extension of R&D or Innovation Lock-in? 
According to the surveyed firms the national Brand Australia campaign is 
intrinsically linked with R&D priorities and therefore has significant implications for 
extension of that R&D. Legislated under the articles of the GWRDC, the industry’s 
R&D is formulated to achieve ‘greatest return on investment’. In other words, these 
guidelines are dictated by the most common need, the ability to undertake the research 
and greatest return in outcomes (Grape and Wine Research and Development 
Corporation, 2004). These guidelines reflect the industry’s generic marketing strategy. 
The focus is primarily on national viticultural and oenological management in the 
pursuit of a product that is disease free, is of consistent quality, is technically 
acceptable, is blended from multiple regions, represents value for money, and is of 
instant, age-free appeal. Such a product appropriately targets the popular-premium 
price points that Australia dominates and, according to the industry bodies, represents 
the best return financially (although much of that return belongs to overseas interests).  
 
The strategy does, however, do little for building Australia’s reputation as a fine wine 
producer or supplier. The majority of surveyed firms believe that in order to create 
differentiated products, differentiated R&D is essential. Whether it be canopy 
management, disease control, soil analysis, irrigation, pest management or rootstock 
development, firms argue that these are region-specific problems requiring region-
specific solutions. Instead, ‘solutions’ tend to come in a pre-fabricated format that 
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often fails to address individual concerns but does reflect classical lock-in 
characteristics (Park & Lee, 2004). 
 
Despite the fact that appropriate R&D extension is viewed by operators as a pre-
requisite to the creation of regionally branded networks and as an indicator of the 
industry’s research breadth, only 21% believed that the industry organisations were 
addressing these issues. As one firm CEO stated, “There needs to be more industry 
consultation prior to setting agendas, from everyone, not just the big boys”. This 
sentiment is reinforced by innovation theorists such as Boschma (2004), who 
contends that there is substantial risk of institutional lock-in when policy reflects the 
interests of the dominant players rather than an open system where it is directed by 
new players and economic renewal.  
 
It appears that this sentiment was fairly uniform among firms, with widespread calls 
for decentralisation of R&D. Currently, the AWRI, which conducts the vast majority 
of the industry’s research, is based in Adelaide, at the heart of the South Australian 
wine cluster. This centralisation of research of course underscores the generic, one-
size-fits-all approach and perpetuates the discordant imperatives between 
organisations and firms. It also fits neatly within Park and Lee’s (2004) ‘exploitation’ 
model, where the orthodox technological framework is retained at the expense of a 
possibly more compatible, but exploratory one. 
 
A majority of firms (70% of those surveyed) suggest that a more appropriate research 
structure would be one in which the AWRI hub remained at Adelaide in the dominant 
wine cluster, but with appropriately funded and resourced ‘nodes’ within each of the 
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industry’s other major wine regions. In fact, 76% of the surveyed firms believe 
participation in these ‘regional nodes’ was critical to their competitive advantage, an 
issue that will be elaborated on in the discussion.
Discussion 
Regions and reputation 
Supporting regional R&D extension is about providing a research foundation to 
regional production, branding, marketing, distribution and most of all, identity. It is, 
therefore, also about supporting those operators who follow the path of differentiation 
and sell into the higher super-premium and icon price points where a wine’s heritage 
and ‘story’ are essential ingredients (Sanders, 2005). While the higher price points 
represent a far smaller percentage of the overall market, it is the sector, as Brian 
Croser (2006) states, in which reputations are made. Such reputations serve not only 
the individual firm or even the region, but the entire industry.  Industries that 
dominate these price points are recognised as producing high-quality, ‘luxury’ brands 
(Brook, 2000).  
 
The ‘reputation-making’ strategy is evident in France’s Bordeaux region, which is 
known internationally as producing the world’s finest wine. The irony is that of 
Bordeaux’s 20,000 producers, less than 60 are AOC classified and produce wines in 
the icon price points. The remaining producers create often mediocre products that 
sell in the popular-premium and bulk wine price points (between $1-$12 per litre). It 
is the 60 AOC producers, however, that have given Bordeaux and France their fine 
wine reputations (Echikson, 2004).  While New World producers such as Australia 
are dominating the popular-premium price points of international markets, their 
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neglect of the higher categories has earned them a reputation for producing only 
popular-premium wine. This lack of differentiation has created rigid perception 
barriers so that currently, as the popular-premium price-points become further 
exposed to a global surplus, Australian wine firms are finding it almost impossible to 
break into the higher, niche categories. In marketing terms this is referred to as 
‘upward stretch’, reflecting the difficulty in convincing consumers that a reputation at 
one product quality level can be applicable to product quality at a much higher level. 
 
The Non-Regional Approach 
Generic marketing strategies such as ‘Brand Australia’ serve to reinforce these 
barriers by indicating to the world that all Australian wine comes from the ‘same 
barrel’. Compounding the perception is the industry’s apparent desire to remain 
focused exclusively on the popular-premium category despite its increased 
competition, reduced margins and capacity to undermine reputation. For example, the 
latest industry figures confirm that export value continues to drop in this sector. 
Although the Australian industry has exceeded targets in volume exported, dollar 
value has fallen from US $13.87/gallon in 2001 to US $11/gallon in 2006. Further, in 
the fine wine category of US $21/gallon or more volume has dropped by a significant 
41%. As Brian Croser (2006) so eloquently states: 
“…both Australia and America eventually need to establish recognition of their fine 
wines at the same elevation and to the same extent as France. Faced with a supply 
induced global race to the bottom, success in the branded commodity wine business is 
not enough to sustain a mature profitable position as a supplier of wine in the global 
wine business”.
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Industry organisations, however, still see this popular segment as producing the 
greatest return for the investment dollar. What must be questioned is a strategy that 
continues to focus on an increasingly difficult price-point while neglecting the 
substantial ‘returns’ from an image of quality, differentiation and fine-wine reputation 
that only the high-price points can deliver. Such discordant strategies and their R&D 
requirements contribute to the inertial tendencies now being witnessed (Interviews, 
GWRDC & WFA reps, 2005 in current study). 
Direct and relevant comparisons can be drawn between the current ‘Brand Australia’ 
strategy and a ‘mass market’ strategy adopted by one of Australia’s largest wine 
firms, between the 1970s and early 1990s. Although this firm had a long history of 
wine-making and renowned expertise, it chose in this period to focus exclusively on 
satisfying the mass market, namely bulk and popular categories. For two and a half 
decades it produced large volumes of acceptable but ‘industrialised’ wine for the mass 
market at home and abroad. The product was cheap and reliable, but only ever 
considered appropriate for parties and less discerning clientele. The firm, however, 
never pretended to be anything other than a mass-market supplier and it was a strategy 
that remained profitable throughout the Australian industry’s early years of maturity. 
The scenario was very similar to that of the industry –level approach today; to focus 
exclusively on that segment of the market currently delivering the greatest returns. 
 
By the mid-1990s, the international wine industry and its clientele had matured 
considerably. Bulk wine was no longer the preferred beverage of the masses, not even 
for parties. The firm’s sales were falling sharply, margins were being squeezed and 
profits were shrinking. The new strategy was to move substantially ‘upmarket’. The 
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firm’s years of expertise and knowledge were drawn upon to create good-to-excellent 
wines of distinction for the premium and super-premium categories. Production was 
reconfigured from mass production of bulk wine to smaller, batch lots of the new 
product. After ten years of this ‘new’ strategy and despite making excellent wines that 
have attracted many awards, the firm still struggles to shake its former reputation. 
Consumers have memories of what the name once signified and to some degree still 
stigmatise the products. Only through perseverance and intense marketing campaigns 
is the firm slowly bringing about a change in consumer culture and acceptance. At an 
industry level, many argue that the Australian Wine sector is repeating this flawed 
strategy by sacrificing long-term reputation for short-term profit, even as other New 
World industries make the transition (Croser, 2006; Sydney Morning Herald, 2006). It 
is a strategy, of course, which closely represents Genschel’s (1997) inertial model: 
“…the avoidance of disruptions in the near future may lock actors into developmental 
pathways which lead into dead ends.” 
 
Branding Advantages 
A recent study of the Californian wine industry, for example, discovered 
that even in the strongly branded Napa Valley region, which critics often refer to as 
the ‘Walled City of Napa’, producers are changing their strategy to target the higher 
price points. As one CEO in the study stated: 
“…I have concentrated on improving the quality, raising the price and building our 
reputation as a high quality producer of some different varietals. I wanted to avoid us 
falling into the trap of focussing too much attention on satisfying the low price 
consumer; instead moving us more upmarket where our wines are better positioned” 
(Taplin, 2006). 
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Confirming the value of a differentiated, high value approach is a 2006 report 
highlighting the fact that while the majority of wine industries are suffering from 
severe over-supply, the 1st growth (icon) producers of Bordeaux are experiencing the 
highest demand for many years. The latest figures show that futures buyers are 
requesting 2,500 cases of 2005 Chateau Latour, Chateau Rothschilds and Haut Brion 
at approximately $6,500 a case and receiving fewer than 500 cases due to excessive 
demand (NineMSN, 2006). This trend also applies with the new wave garagistes of
Bordeaux, who have adopted methods antithetical to New World industries. 
Specifically, these include over-pruning, extracting ultra-low yields, extending the 
ripening period, hand-picking, hand-sorting, ageing in up to 200% French oak 
(cellaring in one barrel, then a second, to increase the oak flavour) and ultimately, 
hand-crafting their wines (Echikson, 2004). The result is a relatively small production 
of elegant wines that have received detailed attention from the vineyard to the bottle 
and may command prices of between $5,000 and $7,000 a case. More importantly, 
however, is the reputation that such wines and their makers are attracting and the 
localized branding that results. This is where the long-term, sustained value lies 
(Croser, 2006). 
 
A model for region-specific R&D in Australia 
A key factor in regional identity is the product’s reputation for quality and 
differentiation - a reputation that distinguishes the product and the region from the 
rest of the market. Always underlying this reputation is the research and development 
that feeds into the creation of that product. As Croser (2006) claims, the Australian 
wine industry is “under greater pressure for innovation and export market 
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development” in the face of oversupply. According to the wine firms themselves, this 
‘development’ must take the form of region-specific extension.  
 
An interesting model for such extension is one that was cited in the current study’s 
findings that actually builds on current innovation frameworks and infrastructure. As 
it is an extension of an existing model it also reduces the element of perceived risk 
that is currently locking the industry into defined R&D pathways (Aylward, 2006b). 
Specifically, the model would provide for a framework beyond the Australian Wine 
Research Institute which conducts approximately 90% of the industry’s applied 
research and a significant amount of its basic research.  
 
This extended framework would involve ‘hub and spoke’ extension, in which the 
AWRI would receive industry research funding as it does now, but rather than 
allocating from a central pool, would re-allocate to regional winemaking and grape-
grower associations. Allocation would be determined by the region’s firm population, 
its perceived need, the type of research requested, the strength of the cluster and 
branding and the perceived capacity of the firms to absorb the R&D (Visser, 2004). 
The prescribed funding allocation would include resources for appropriately qualified 
personnel, education, and infrastructure at each of the association sites, which would, 
in effect, become R&D nodes. These nodes would be responsible for regional R&D 
governance, as well as the management of R&D supply and demand. Their interests 
would be in alignment with those of their subscriber firms and the region in which 
they are located. There would be substantially less duplication in R&D type as the 
nodes would operate according to regional, rather than central mandates.  
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This type of model would ensure a number of additional improvements. First, R&D 
extension would become more flexible and responsive, as intimate collaboration 
between the nodes and their subscriber firms would allow for constant adjustment to 
R&D flow. Second, the decentralisation to node level would allow greater 
‘ownership’ by subscriber firms and more interactive decision-making – an issue that 
registered strongly in the study’s survey. Third, the two above improvements would 
create greater efficiencies in R&D delivery and enhance R&D planning ability for 
regional initiatives. Most importantly, the R&D node initiative would support regional 
branding and identity to a much greater extent than exists currently. This would in 
turn disrupt the path dependency of the industry’s innovation framework, thus 
reducing a tendency towards lock-in or inertia. The primary objective of such a 
model, and the measure of its success, would be a re-alignment of industry 
organisation and firm imperatives. Only by reducing the inertial ‘gap’ between these 
imperatives can R&D extension truly contribute to competitive advantage at price 
points other than that of the popular-premium category. 
 
Concluding remarks 
We are currently witnessing the emergence of a new and very differently configured 
wine landscape. It is a landscape that transcends national borders and is punctuated by 
international wine conglomerates. In what would seem a paradox, these 
conglomerates have, at one level, homogenised much of the industry product within 
the bulk and popular-premium categories. They have streamlined distribution, created 
flexible production points, purchased geographically diverse vineyards and 
standardized oenological and viticulture practices. At another level, their 
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transcendence of national borders has created unique and previously unlikely nexi of 
global/local interests.  
 
As national borders and, therefore, national approaches become less relevant, regional 
wine clusters are responding directly to these global pressures – specifically pressures 
for differentiated products at the higher price-points in world markets. While a 
homogenised product is demanded and easily satisfied within popular price categories 
it is the more discerning price points within mature markets that require the 
differentiation, heritage and stories that many regional SME producers can supply.  
 
Regional clustering provides the critical mass which the firms need for distribution 
channels and shelf space. But just as importantly, it allows for more streamlined 
supply chains, superior networking, knowledge spill-over and most of all, branding of 
the region and its differentiated products. What these regional clusters currently lack, 
however, is the region-specific R&D extension that would support such advantages. 
While it appears that wine firms across major regions are reconfiguring their 
production, marketing and distribution operations to align with shifting paradigms of 
the global market, their industry organizations are responding to discordant 
imperatives. These imperatives derive from the industry’s pre-fabricated ‘2025 
vision’, which mandates a national approach to branding, R&D, marketing and 
distribution. The resulting inertial gap between the two sets of imperatives threatens 
to undermine the industry’s capacity for change. Without change, the Australian wine 
industry will lock itself into what Brian Croser (2006) describes as a ‘race to the 
bottom’. The potential to create a truly differentiated product will be lost for many, if 
not most, producers as their growing reputation for commodity wine precedes them. If 
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imperatives are aligned and change allowed, however, the Australian wine industry 
may recapture its ability to surprise the world.  
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